North Dakota Law Review
Volume 61

Number 2

Article 3

1985

Rethinking the American Family Law
Samuel M. Davis

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Davis, Samuel M. (1985) "Rethinking the American Family Law," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 61 : No. 2 ,
Article 3.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol61/iss2/3

This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

INTRODUCTION
"RETHINKING" AMERICAN FAMILY LAW

SAMUEL

M. DAVIS*

Few areas of the law have witnessed more extensive or more
dynamic change than domestic relations law in the last decade.
Perhaps the single greatest development during this period was the
widespread adoption by most states of a "no-fault" ground for
divorce, a development that occurred with such alacrity once it got
underway that is now passe. Other significant developments, some
of which are continuing, were the move toward equitable
distribution schemes by common law or "title" states; changing
notions of the state-parent-child relationship in terms of
decisionmaking for children, particularly medical decisionmaking
and decisionmaking as to what constitutes adequate parenting; and
the increasing role of the Constitution in family law, especially
regarding procreational choice.
The process of change continues at an ever-increasing pace.
One need only look at the topics covered in this symposium to gain
an awareness of issues of current interest in domestic relations law.
These issues can be grouped under two broad headings: (1)
economic issues, i.e., resolving the economic issues between the
parties, such as alimony, child support, and property division
(mediation could be included here because it is principally an
alternate means by which economic issues are resolved); and (2)
*B.A., University of Southern Mississippi, 1966;J.D., University of Mississippi, 1969; LL.M.,
Universit'y,' of'Virginia, 1970. Professor of Law, University of'GeorgiaSchoolof la.
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"people" issues, which often require assessing the personal
relationships between parties or between parties and the state, e.g.,
custody of children, child abuse, abortion, and adoption
(mediation could be included here as well because it is frequently
employed as a means to resolve personal issues between the
parties).
A great deal of "rethinking" of traditional doctrines in
domestic relations law has occurred in recent years, especially with
respect to the economic issues. Indeed, in legal education so much
classroom time is now devoted to coverage of the economic
consequences of marital breakdown that this area of domestic
relations law is practically a subject in its own right. 1
The theoretical bases of spousal support have been examined
and reexamined. Since Orr v. Orr, 2 of course, alimony has been sexneutral, but both before and after Orr the underlying theories of
spousal support have been questioned, even to the point of
questioning the continued need for post-divorce alimony, at least in
its present form. 3 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, for
example, provides for alimony only if the spouse seeking it lacks
sufficient property to satisfy his or her needs and is unable to
support himself or herself through employment, if appropriate. 4
Some states provide only for "rehabilitative" alimony for a limited
5
period of time following dissolution of the marriage .
Another economic issue that has undergone considerable
reexamination is that of allocation of property of the parties upon
divorce. There are eight community property states in the
country, 6 and the remaining forty-two are common law or "title"
states. During the last several years, however, all of the common
law states have adopted some form of "deferred community"
approach to marital property. By 1974, all but fifteen common law
1. A new casebook on the subject of resolving the economic issues was published within the last
year. J. KRAUSKOPF, CASES ON PROPERTY DIVISION AT MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION (1984). New editions
of existing casebooks typically give expanded coverage to the economic issues. See, e.g., W.
WADLINCTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 987-1252'(1984). Much of the
recent literature in family law is addressed to "rethinking" some of the economic consequences of
marital breakdown, or in some cases, of nonmarital breakups. See, e.g., W. WEYRAUCI & S. KATZ,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION (1983); M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW

PROPERTY (1981); Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553 (1984). Oldham, Is
the Concept of Marital Property Outdated?, 22 J. FAM. L. 263 (1984); Reppy, Property and Support Rights of
Unmarried Cohabitants:A ProposalforCreating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677 (1984).
2. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
3. See, e.g., Olsen v. Olsen, 98 Idaho 10, 12-22, 557 P.2d 604, 606-16 (1976) (Shepard, J.,
dissenting).
4. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT S 308(a) (1973); see also IDAHO CODE § 32-705(1)

(1983).
5. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1983) (rehabilative alimony limited to three years).
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, § 5.14 (1984).

6. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D.
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states had adopted such an approach; by 1976 the number of
holdouts had dwindled to nine; by 1982 the number had shrunk to
two; and by 1983 all had abandoned the pure common law
approach.' Equitable distribution is such a growing and thriving
movement today that a new journal has been inaugurated to keep
8
up with its fast-paced developments .
One of the economic consequences of dissolution of marriage
relates to treatment of alimony, child support, and property
division under the federal and state income tax laws. Since the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 9 a transfer by
one spouse to the other of appreciated property, in exchange for a
release of marital rights by the other spouse, has been regarded as a
taxable event, with the result that any gain from appreciation was
taxable to the transferor. 10 This past year, however, Congress
enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1984.11 One of its principal
changes, which are numerous and complex, is the overruling of the
Davis case. Under the new provision, 12 no gain is recognized on
transfers between spouses or between former spouses incident to
divorce. 13
Not all current developments in domestic relations law have
been of the economic variety. Some of the developments affect the
people" issues or personal relationships between the parties or the
parties and the state. Here, too, courts and commentators in
particular have engaged in "rethinking" some of the traditional
doctrines prevalent in domestic relations law. A current experiment
in child custody determination, for example, is the concept of joint
custody, and the scholarly literature on the subject is burgeoning. 14
Child custody generally is undergoing reexamination. For
The eight community property states are: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Id.,
7. Oldham, Is the Concept of Marital Property Outdated., 22 J. FAM. L. 263 & n.1 (1984). West
Virginia, by judicial decision, was the last state to abandon the pure common law approach. Id.
Immediately afterwards the legislature enacted an equitable distribution statute. See Special Topic,
Equitable Distribution,87 W. VA. L. REV. 87 (1984).
8. See EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION JOURNAL. This journal is a monthly publication in newsletter

Ibrmat published by the National Legal Research Group, Inc., ofCharlottesville, Virginia.

9.370 U.S. 65 (1962).
10. The gain realized by the transferor was the difference between present fair market value less
the original value or cost basis. Present fair market value became the basis in the property of the
transferee. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, at 71-73 (1962).
11. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (to be codified in scattered sections of"26 U.S.C.).
12. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1041 (Dec. 1984 Pamphlet).
13. In addition, under the new provision the transferee takes the basis of the transferor in the
property. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1041 (Dec. 1984 Pamphlet).
14. See, e.g., JOINT CUSTODY AND SIIARtD PARENTING (J. Folberg ed. 1984); Scott & Derdeyn,
RethinkingJoint Custody, 45 Otio ST. L.J. 455 (1984); Robinson, Joint Custody: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 21 J. FAM. L. 641 (1983); Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet To
Learn, and the.Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 739 (1983); Kelly, Further
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example, the "tender years" presumption, by which the mother of
a child of tender years is presumed to be entitled to custody of the
child, has been questioned. In Garska v. McCoy, 15 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals abandoned the traditional tender years
presumption in favor of a sex-neutral "primary caretaker"
presumption. 16
Another child custody doctrine undergoing rethinking is the
parental rights doctrine, the rule that in a child custody dispute
between a parent and a third party, the parent has a right to
custody of the child absent a strong showing of unfitness. Of
particular interest has been the concept of "psychological
parenthood" as introduced or at least given high visibility by
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in 1973. 11 If courts have not
enthusiastically adopted the concept of psychological parenthood in
name,

some certainly

have been

influenced

by

it.8

In

the

meantime, professionals in law and the social sciences have
continued an ongoing dialogue on the concept of parenthood
generally and the validity of the psychological parenthood concept
as applied to child custody decisionmaking. 19
Scholars have continued to explore such diverse matters as the
nature of childhood itself,20 the effects of divorce on children, 21 and
Observations on joint Custody, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 762 (1983); Nestor, Developing Cooperation Between
Hostile Parents at Divorce, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 771 (1983); Reece, Joint Custody: A Cautious View, 16
U.C.D. L. REV. 775 (1983). For ajudicial view of thejoint custodial arrangement see In reMarriage
ofWeidner, 338 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1983).
15. __
W. Va. __
, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
16. Id. at __
, 278 S.E.2d at 362-63. The primary caretaker is the parent who has taken
primary responsibility for:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3)
purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips
to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e.,
transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6)
arranging alternative care, i.e., babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at
night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning; (8)
disciplining, i.e., teaching general manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e.,
religious, cultural, social, etc.; and (10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading,
writing and arithmetic.
Id. at ____, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
For more recent applications of the primary caretaker presumption see T.C.B. v. H.A.B.,
W. Va.
-_, 317 S.E.2d 174 (1984); J.E.I. v. L.M.I., __
W. Va. __
, 314 S.E.2d 67 (1984).
For a comentary on abolition of the tender years presumption in onejurisdiction see Note, Coming of
Age in Alabama: Ex parte Divine Abolishes the Tender Years Presumption, 34 ALA. L. REV. 305 (1983).
17. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNiT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
The same three authors collaborated on a later book that further explored the psychological
parenthood concept. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF TIlE
CHiLD (1979).

18. See, e.g., Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983);
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976).
19. See, e.g., The Impact of PsychologicalParentingon Child Welfare Decision-making, 12 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 485 (1984); see generally Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status. The
Needfor Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984).
20. See, e.g., F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982).
21. See, e.g., CHILDREN OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE: MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT (I. Stewart
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the delicate and often controversial relationship between the child,
the parent, and the state.2 2 In regard to the latter, controversy
typically centers on whether children are to be accorded more
autonomy than has traditionally been the case or should be
accorded increased protection because of their status as minors.
The conflict between the autonomy and protection models nowhere
has been more painfully obvious or controversial than in the
abortion decisions. 23 Equally controversial, in terms of the conflict
between parental and state authority, have been the medical
24
decisionmaking cases.
Related to the above cases are those involving child abuse,
because here, too, is found conflict between parental views and
authoritarian views, represented by the state, of what constitutes
adequate parenting. 25 Cases of sexual abuse especially have
captured the public's attention as a result of increased media
& L. Abt eds. 1981); J. WALLERSTEIN &J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND
PARENTS COPE WITHl DIVORCE (1980); Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: Preliminay Report of a Ten- Year
Follow-Up of Young Children, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 444 (1984); Heatherington, Effects of Divorce
on Parents and Young Children, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233
(M. Lamb cd. 1982); Wallerstein & Kelly, Effects ofDivorce on the Father-ChildRelationship, 137 AM. J.
PSYCInAT. 1534 (1980); Heatherington, Divorce: A Child's Perspective, 34 AMER. PSCHOL. 851 (1979).
22. See, e.g.,N. REPUCCI, L. WEITHORN, E. MULREY & J. MONAHAN, CHILDREN, MENTAL
HEALTH, AND THE LAW (1984); WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT (W.
Gaylin & R. Macklin eds. 1982); Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus ofMarriage,Kinship, andSexual Privacy
- Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983); Keiter, Privacy, Children and
Their Parents:Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme Court'sApproach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459 (1982).
23. Compare City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2498-99
(1983) (city ordinance requiring written consent from parent or guardian for a minor under 15 to
have an abortion unless the minor obtained a court order authorizing the abortion held
Unconstitutional because it did not offer a consent substitute affording a minor an opportunity to
demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to decide foi herself or that despite her immaturity, the
abortion would be in her best interests) with Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517,
2526 (1983) (statute requiring parental or court consent for unemancipated minor to have an
abortion upheld on the ground it offered appropriate alternatives).
24. See, e.g., Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983);
Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979); Matter of Hoflbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648,
393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979). For commentary on the problem generally see A.
HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE (2d ed. 1985); Baron, Medicine and
Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and ProceduralProtectionsfor Medical Decision Making Within
the Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1983); Note, Choosingfor Children:Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between
Parentsand the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157 (1983); Weithorn, DevelopmentalFactors and Competence to
Make Informed Treatment Decisions, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES 85 (G.
Melton ed. 1982).
Within this already controversial area, perhaps the cases involving the greatest emotion and,
therefore, generating the greatest controversy, are the so-called "Baby Doe" cases. See, e.g., United
States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984);
Weber '.Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d
1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983). Some states have enacted legislation in response to the problem of
when, if at all, life support may be withdrawn from an infant. See, e.g.,
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3(o
(Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 40:1299.36.1- .3 (Supp. 1985). The Louisiana statute was
interpreted in In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982). For general commentary on the issue of
medical decisionmaking for newborn infants see R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF
HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS (1984); Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die. Who Decides, 7 Am.J.L. & MED.
393 (1982).
25. What, for example, constitutes the dividing line between permissible parental discipline and
impermissible, prohibited child maltreatment? See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 641 P.2d 276 (Colo.
1982); Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 389 A.2d 341 (1978).
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coverage.26 Child abuse is a pervasive problem, characterized by
one court as "the most pernicious social ailment which afflicts our
society. "27 The emotion-generating phenomenon has produced
numerous legal issues to which legislatures and courts alike have
been responsive, 28 and scholarly commentary on the subject has
29
continued to flourish.
By far the most provocative, challenging and, if one is
permitted a bias, interesting development in family law has been
the move toward redefining the outer limits - medical and legal of procreative choice. 30 Ironically, the events drawing the most
attention are at opposite ends of the procreative choice spectrum:
on one end, the decision to have children although by
nontraditional means, such as in vitro fertilization, surrogate
motherhood, or artificial insemination, and on the opposing end,
the decision not to have children, through abortion. In both cases,
advances in medical technology have placed enormous pressure on
the legal system to meet the challenges posed by the new
technology. The consequence of failure is that the gap between
medicine and law will continue to widen, resulting in increased
confusion and uncertainty on such crucial questions as when life
begins, when it is entitled to protection and when the parent-child
relationship is - and is not - created.
One writer has coined the term "collaborative conception" to
refer to the various means by which a man and woman might use
the participation of third parties in the conception or gestation of a
child. 31 The legal issues associated with collaborative conception
are at once fascinating and problematical, ranging from the issue of
paternity in the case of artificial insemination 32 to the issue of
maternity in the case of surrogate motherhood3 3 to broad-range
26. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, September 10, 1984, at 14, 19; t.,August 20, 1984, at 44; Id. May
14, 1984, at30.
27. Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 725 (Wyo. 1983).
28. No attempt is made here to set forth these issues since they are the subject of an article
submitted as a part of this symposium. See Davis, ChildAbuse: Pervasive Problem of the 80s. 61 N.D. L.
Ray. 193 (1985).
29. Here, also, no attempt is made to set forth an exhaustive compendium of the literature on
child abuse. Two recent entries are M. LYNCH &J. ROBERTS, CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE (1982)
and E. NEWBERGER, CHILD ABUSE (1982). Others are mentioned in Davis, supra note 28, at nn. 1 & 4

(1985).
30. A colleague at the University of Georgia School of Law, Paul M. Kurtz, recently asked this
author to review a draft of a chapter - titled "Procreational Liberties" - of a forthcoming Family
Law casebook. The author was impressed not only with the quality of the writing and the breadth of
careful coverage given this important topic, but equally impressed with an objective, abstract truth
- that virtually every time a writer puts pen to paper on this fast-developing subject, the coverage is
more timely than anything else already in print.
31. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L.
Rav. 405, 410 (1983).
32. See, e.g., R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 39, 670 P.2d 923 (1983).
33. See, e.g., Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983); Doe v.
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medico-legal ethical issues inherent in the concept - and practice
34
- of in vitro fertilization.
On the other end of the continuum, medical advances that
now make it possible to preserve the life of foetuses at an earlier and
earlier point in the gestation period effectively have moved the
point of viability closer to conception. 35 Perhaps the Supreme
Court thought of viability as a more or less static term when it used
that stage to delineate the point at which the state's interest in foetal
life was greatest in Roe v. Wade. 36 Medical redefinition of viability
may force the Court to rethink the tri-semester medical model, first
implemented in Roe v. Wade.37
The dilemma, then, is as follows. Because life can now begin
on a laboratory dish and the fertilized embryo implanted in a
woman's womb, medical science is in the, process of redefining
conception

and gestation

-

and perhaps parenthood

-

in

nontraditional terms. Because a prematurely delivered foetus can
now be kept alive at an earlier point than previously thought
possible - and, indeed, correct research is on the verge of
breakthroughs that may move the point to an even earlier stage.medical science is in the process of redefining viability. These
developments have far-reaching implications for family law. Law
must respond to the changes wrought by the new technology. As
long as legal rules continue to be based on medical premises, as the
premises change, so must the legal rules. The path of medical
science is, by nature, often experimental, but today's experiment is
frequently tomorrow's reality. The task of legislatures and courts is
to meet the current medical realities with informed and creative
solutions.
The list of current issues outlined here is by no means
exhaustive. Even among the few issues mentioned, however, any
one would furnish the basis for thought-provoking, controversial,
Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
34. Perhaps the most thought-provoking and issue-generating case is one from Australia
reported in June 1984. A California couple died in 1983, leaving two frozen embryos produced from
iheir sperm and ova in 1981. Washington Post, June 18, 1984, at A4, col. 2. Were the embryos
"persons"? To whom did they belong? Did they "belong" to anyone?
For an attempt by an American court, representing the "legal system," to deal with the
perplexing problems posed by the in vitro technology, see Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.
Ill. 1983).
The most thoughtful discussion of artificial or "collaborative"
conception generally is
Wadlington, Artificial Conception. The ChallengeforFamily Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465 (1983).
35. The new technology is described and its implications for family law discussed in Rhoden,
The New Neonatal Dilenma',Live Birthsfrom Late Abortions, 72 GEo. L.J. 1451 (1984); see also Kleiman,
When Abortion Becomes Birth: A Dilemma of Medical Ethics Shaken by New Advances, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1984, at BI., col. 1.
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. See Rhoden, supra note 35, at 1499. Evidence that some members of the Court are rethinking
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creative dialogue. Domestic relations law, like criminal law, is
"people"
oriented,
"people"
centered.
People change,
individually and collectively as a society. Values change; priorities
change; institutions change. Ideas, definitions, theories, concepts,
processes - all change. Domestic relations law itself is in a state of
transition, a state in which old values and old doctrines are being
rethought and in the process, rewritten. The challenges are real and
exciting. The expectations are high. The prospects are
encouraging. The time is now.

the issue is found in one of the Court's most recent ahortion decisions. City of Akron v. Akron
Center lor Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2504-12 (1983) (O'Connor,J, dissenting).

